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The United Nations as an International Peacemaker

The world is changing. The last five years have seen the greatest global change since 1945, and this is more than just the collapse of communism. New democratic governments are being set up all over the world: from Cambodia to Chile to South Africa to Haiti and, of course, the states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. From the United Nations' point of view the collapse of communism means the effective end of the block on UN action created by US and USSR vetoes on the Security Council. In this article I want to examine first how the international community and the United Nations might respond to these challenges and then how the UN itself can be best be arranged to deal with them.

The break-up of monolithic Eastern and Western power-blocks marks a trend towards regionalism and greater power for the non-industrialised countries. In 1945 50 states were the original signatories to the UN charter. At the time of writing the UN has 183 members, and a few more states may join it in the near future. More and more smaller states are now acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear arms. With international arms sales (including those from Britain, which is one of the world's five largest arms exporters) proliferating uncontrollably, the greatest threat to world peace for the foreseeable future will come from regional conflicts.

International trade continues to involve an ever-increasing number of states, and the recent completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks has increased this further. Disease and drought more than ever threaten large parts of the world, and refugees from Yugoslavia to much of Africa are still being forced from their homes in huge numbers. Repressive governments all over the world, although they are diminishing in number, continue to suppress the human rights of many hundreds of millions of people. Environmental issues which require global action demand action more than ever.

It is clear both that international activity is increasing and that global events require co-ordinated action from the international community now as never before. To some extent the UN and its members have recognized this: 8 new peacekeeping operations have been initiated since 1988, and there were only 13 in the previous 40 years. Still more areas require UN action, however. With the collapse of the system of opposing factions in the Security Council the opportunity for the UN to act decisively and for the good of the world has never been greater. The question is whether the world will seize that opportunity.

Douglas Hurd has said that the international task of the 1990's is managing disorder. The first and best way in which

this can be done is by preventive diplomacy. This is by no means exclusively a UN role (as last year's Palestinian/Israeli deal proved). Individual nations and regional organizations have all successfully brokered peace deals in many parts of the world in the past, and no doubt will continue to do so. But the UN, with its

"Although in general the principle of open diplomacy should be supported, the full glare of international public attention can be counter-productive"

unrivalled international authority, should be able to contribute to this process too. Sometimes this will be in partnership with other organizations (as with the EC in Yugoslavia), and sometimes the UN will act alone. Often, by the nature of the problem, UN action in bringing antagonists to the conference table together will be done best in secret, and it will not be possible to keep the members of the Security Council, let alone the General Assembly, fully informed about such moves. Although in general the principle of open diplomacy should be supported, again the Norwegian Middle East initiative has shown that the full glare of international public attention can be counter-productive. Such diplomacy must surely therefore revolve around the Secretary-General and his office. The organs of the UN also have a tradition of mandating eminent statesmen and women to act in its name to attempt to resolve

disputes, and their contribution should be recognized. National governments and regional organizations should be prepared to help the Secretary-General in any such moves. In particular the importance of Regional Organizations and the immense influence and pressure which they possess in their own spheres should be recognized. Such fora now exist in every continent and region of the world. In addition to preventing conflict breaking out by means of there may also be occasions when deployment of a force of peace-keeping troops *before* a conflict begins may be helpful, although such a decision would have to be taken by the Security Council. If member states were to make greater use of the International Court of Justice for arbitrating disputes then military action, both by aggressor states and the UN would less frequently be required. In particular the Security Council should be prepared to refer cases of alleged breaches of international law, as suggested in Article 36.3 of the Charter.

The crux of the UN's future role, however, and the criterion by which its success will be judged is whether it is in fact able and prepared to act decisively, and with force where necessary. No-one disputes that preventive diplomacy and economic and other sanctions are far preferable to military action, but the UN will never be the success which it might be if it is not prepared to act with force. The combination of the Cold War and the nature of the Security Council has delayed this question for forty five years, but it can not be put off any longer. The new

environment of greater agreement between the members of the Security Council and the consequent threat of action has already borne fruit in some areas of international conflict, but will not continue to do so unless the SC is seen to be prepared to act where necessary. The powers which the UN charter gives to the General Assembly to discuss and make recommendations on, particularly in the early stages of a dispute, should also be emphasised. The GA should be encouraged, while not infringing on the role of the SC as the UN organ responsible for direction of specific action in order to preserve international peace and stability, to draw attention to and to contribute to the resolution of international disputes. The importance of the role of member states which may not be represented on the SC but which are important regional powers should be emphasised in particular.

The UN has always respected the principles of national sovereignty, and of not interfering in the internal affairs of individual states. This has applied even in situations where we might not perhaps expect it, including drawing back from UN interference in Iraqi affairs to depose Saddam Hussein. It is time to look at this principle again. There are two main reasons for this principle: firstly the belief that one country's affairs are its own, and secondly that other Member States have not always wanted to commit their own resources to resolving other countries' affairs. To deal with the second objection first, it is surely simply not good enough for Member States to abdicate their responsibilities in this

manner. In the past UN action has tended

**"It is time to look again at
the UN's policy of non-
interference"**

to be much less concerted between member states, and more towards unilateral action by certain Members. It is essential that intervention in other states' affairs be made by a broadly-based group of Members, and it is also essential that the cost of such operations be more widely spread among the Members of the UN. In considering the first objection to intervention in domestic national affairs, it is obviously true that such intervention must only be made in exceptional circumstances, and that the scope of the intervention must not be so great as to allow either exploitation of the nation by the Member States intervening there, or to change the nature and the culture of that state drastically. In certain circumstances, however, such action would be justified. As Secretary-General de Cuellar has said, sovereignty does not confer authority for mass slaughter, and the former Italian Foreign Minister Giovanni de Michelis told the GA in September 1991 that "intervention that is aimed primarily at security, the protection of human rights and respect for the basic principle of peaceful co-existence is a prerogative of the international community which must have the power to suspend sovereignty whenever it is exercised in a criminal manner". Under circumstances such as the gross and

persistent denial of the provisions of the UN Declaration of Human Rights to minorities and to individuals, and grossly disruptive international behaviour action designed to result in the creation of a government which respects the principles of human rights and of the rule of international law would be justified. As in the case of aggression by a state economic and diplomatic sanctions should always be preferred, but as a final resort the use of force by the international community must be permitted.

The worst possible course of action is that seen at Gorazde in Bosnia, where the UN intervened, but did so only half-heartedly, and when the Bosnian Serbs returned fire, the UN withdrew. The message which this sends, not just to the Bosnian Serbs, but to any combatant party in a dispute in which the UN is involved, is that if you take on the United Nations, you can get away with it. I believe the consequences which the action at Gorazde will have for the UN's ability to intervene effectively in any such situation will be tremendous. The UN needed to decide, and will need to decide in any future situation, whether it was going to take the course of direct intervention or not. If it was going to take it then it should take it properly, and if not then it should not have got involved at all.

**"the consequences of the
action at Gorazde...will be
tremendous"**

In all previous conflicts, including those in the Gulf since 1990 and in Korea from 1950 the SC has authorized Member States to take action its behalf, and it has never made full use of its powers under Article 42. Although, as previously mentioned, peaceful measures to prevent or end international conflict should be greatly preferred, the SC must make use of its powers. In preparation for this several measures envisaged in the Charter but never fully enacted should now be put in place.

The Military Staff Committee should be reconstituted to undertake control of any military operations mandated by the Security Council. It should be backed up by an Operational Staff, who would act as a General Staff for UN military operations. This has not previously existed, but it should be established as soon as possible, and should be a permanent staff for co-ordinating UN peacemaking and peacekeeping operations all over the world. It should prepare plans for potential operations, and should be a permanent staff on standby at the disposal of the SC. It would enable personnel from different Member States to become used to working with each other before a crisis arose. Some might then be deployed with the troops as the result of a resolution on the ground, and would ensure that the operation on the ground did not, as now, have to begin from scratch.

It is essential that future actions by the UN's organs should be strictly regulated by mandates from the Security Council. Current operations (e.g. in Somalia) have

shown that the link between the actions of the troops on the ground and the intentions of the SC and its Members. It is clearly difficult to draw a strict division between the two, and it is very important that the UN commander should have control of his troops, but the strategic aims of any campaign must be defined by the mandating resolution. It is also vital that troops contributed by Member States should be prepared to obey their commanders on the ground, even if he be from another nation. Where it is envisaged there may be a particular problem with this, troops from certain states should perhaps not be deployed to certain other nations. In particular it is vital that troops should not need to consult with their own governments before obeying UN orders.

"Sovereignty does not confer authority for mass slaughter"

If the UN is to take this kind of action on a more regular basis, and is to acquire a much larger international role, then it must have at its head an effective body, which commands influence and respect throughout the world. I believe that this requires ironing out the anomalous composition of the Security Council. Because of the United Nations' origins as an organization set up by the victorious powers after World War Two, the original charter gave them disproportionate control over the UN. In particular the case for British, and to a lesser extent French, membership has been greatly undermined since then: in 1945 Britain, in theory at

least, through her empire, represented the interests of a sizeable proportion of the the world's population. Since then membership of the UN has grown from 51 to 183 and, while the size of the SC has grown from 11 to 15 to reflect this, the WWII victors retain their permanent positions and their vetoes on it. Other countries, however, who might have a claim to be permanently represented there, notably Germany, Japan, and Israel, are excluded from such a position of power.

It is still true that the five permanent members include the countries most active in the international arena, and they are still, militarily, among the most powerful in the world. In addition, the five have the advantages that they are able to make a substantial contribution to international diplomacy through their highly skilled and experienced diplomats. There is clearly a very strong case for the USA retaining its permanent seat on the SC. It continues to play a major part in many UN operations, and is a populous and powerful nation, industrially, economically and militarily. It is highly unlikely that the USA would be any less involved in international affairs if it were no longer a member of the SC, and harnessing the USA within the UN is therefore desirable. Britain and France also continue to play a major part in many UN operations, and it is desirable that they should continue to be represented, by some means, on the SC.

There seems to be little justification for Russia maintaining its seat, unless for reasons of nuclear control. Similarly, China is not involved in international affairs in

any way outside Eastern Asia, and therefore there seems to be little reason for it to continue to be represented on the SC. It has been suggested that keeping China within the fold of international diplomacy may help to restrain it from further human rights abuses, but this has not been the case in the past. There is no indication that it is presently constrained by being part of the international community, or that it would have treated its own citizens any more harshly in the past if it had not been an important part of the UN. Outside pressure does not seem to alter Chinese government policy easily, and to the extent that it does, membership or non-membership of the UN is a relatively minor part of this pressure: it would for instance still be possible, and indeed easier, to impose trade and military sanctions if it were not permanently represented on the SC.

There are perhaps some arguments for having at least one permanent member of the SC which is still communist (especially since many of the third world non-permanent members are communist), and also for having a permanent representative of Asian nations among an otherwise rather Euro-centric group. Whether this argument

"A permanent seat does not necessarily mean a veto"

carries any weight depends on what extent the SC is seen as a forum for various regional powers to come together, which has the advantages of permanent

representation of regional interests on the Council, global co-ordination of local action through local leaders, and perhaps also a degree of international supervision and restraint of regional powers. The present system of election of the non-permanent members, however, ensures that there are always representatives of all parts of the world on the SC, and it is likely that the future will see not only China herself becoming less dominated by Marxist dogma, but with the withdrawal of support for third world Marxist governments from the USSR, the global division between communist and non-communist third world states will diminish.

Both Germany and Japan were excluded from permanent membership in 1945, when their international position before the war would have justified it. Their constitutions have prevented them from deploying any troops abroad since 1945, although German troops have been sent to join the UN force in Somalia for the first time, and Japanese troops have also now been deployed by the Organization. There is perhaps an argument that if Japan is not permitted to contribute to international diplomacy directly through her own troops, she should be permitted to have a say in the UN's actions, and certainly there does not seem to be any good reason for Japan not to contribute troops to multinational UN forces. Japan's large contribution to the budget of the UN (at 12% greater than that of any permanent member except the USA) and her growing importance, as well as in Eastern Asia, in the international community seem to indicate that perhaps

she should have a place at the SC table. It seems better to have powerful nations as important parts of the UN rather than outside it.

Similarly with Germany there is no reason why her troops could not be deployed with UN troops from other countries and under UN control. As a senior member of NATO Germany has for many years now been integrated into Western defence arrangements, and through the WEU and the Council of Ministers of the EC it enjoys a some influence over the foreign and security policies of other nations (e.g. shown over Yugoslavia). There does not therefore seem to be much resentment at German diplomatic input, even in Europe, although whether this would extend to inclusion among the four or five most diplomatically active nations on the Security Council is open to question. What seems more likely to be the form of European contributions to the SC in the future and one which will surely be more constructive and contribute to international (and European) harmony is some kind of joint EC seat or seats on the Council. This will clearly not be viable for many years yet, since the EC's own attempts at finding a common defence and security policy, beyond keeping the USSR out of Western Europe, have revealed deep divisions within itself. It is unlikely that the countries of the EC will be able to form anything like a common foreign policy in the near future, and therefore the holding of a joint UN seat is not viable for the foreseeable future. Until that time comes it seems sensible that Germany, which is also a very

powerful nation and contributes much to the UN's budget (9%) should have a seat of her own on the SC.

Possession of a permanent seat, however, does not necessarily mean that a nation must have a permanent veto over all SC action. In these days after the Cold War, consensus is much easier to achieve, but it could be made still easier by the abolition of the veto. The only country which there is a real argument for having a veto is the USA, and the wider international community would certainly not tolerate a situation in which the USA alone had the power of veto over all UN actions. Since it would be unacceptable for the USA alone to retain a veto, and no single balancing nation now exists, if any permanent vetos were retained at all, something very like the present arrangement would be likely to persist.

The United Nations, then, faces an unprecedented challenge, both to international peace and security and to its own authority. I believe that in order to tackle these problems and deal with them effectively it must take on new powers to intervene in trouble spots. This can only happen when the international community has the political will to support it, but it is vital for the sake of peace and stability that it does so. In order to control such a machine and to command the support of the whole diplomatic community, the Security Council itself must be reformed.

Jeremy Hargreaves will be President of The Oxford Reform Club in Michaelmas 1994, and he is in his second year reading Greats at Christ Church.

The Cult of Windsor

Albert Marin Catterall
considers the future role of
the Monarchy

"Night is coming on, and the urgent meretricious tones of the television muzak are heard. We know that this strident, bombastic noise is a subliminal appeal to think of 'news' as part drama, part sensation and part entertainment...we are won over to give it another chance. What is being heralded by the racket this time? It might be fire, flood or communiqué. Is it tomorrow's talking point, or is it one of those events that stay imprinted on the memory for good? Well neither actually. On the evening I'm thinking of, the first and longest bulletin from a potential world of agony and ecstasy was one which sounded a false alarm. The Queen Mother had been incommoded by a morsel of food wedged in her throat" ¹

Everything that we identify this country with is pervaded by the monarchy. When we post a letter, we lick a sticky label with a profile of the Queen on so that we can use the "Royal Mail". We go shopping with bits of metal with the Queen's face on one side. And then when we switch on the television or radio, or read a newspaper, it is quite likely that the main news story is on the royal family. But even if it isn't it may instead be on "Her Majesty's Government" or the "Loyal Opposition". We read with revulsion of those countries where worship of individuals has turned to sickly adulation – yet

it is those very characteristics which are most in abundance here.

The more you think about it, the more you realise how much the monarchy enters our life. We are defended by the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and royally commissioned regiments. At every stage the adjective "royal" is an enhancer. As William Cobbett remarked, you could tell a lot about a country which referred to the Royal Mint and the National Debt. Even our name as a country, the very epitome of all that we are, refers to royalty. The United State of Great Britain would be unnerving, and the United Republic sounds positively foreign. No, our name is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. First and foremost we define ourselves as a monarchy.

However, I believe this is only the surface of something much deeper. From the time we are born we are brought up in an environment which conditions us to have a longing need and desire for monarchy. It is not something we have decided on, but rather something subconscious. In some other countries all the senses are bombarded into the worship of individuals. So why if there is a similar bombardment here can we not realise it?

Monarchists say that the Queen has no real power, but is a 'force' for continuity, stability

and other establishment values. It is this contradiction which I believe illuminates the fault in the Republican debate. As Max Weber explained, authority comes in three forms: the traditional based on custom and convention, the legislative, and the charismatic. We tend to think that power means only the legal sort, but it is only the most recent one of three. Not even the most perfect written constitution can avoid relying somewhere on unwritten powers, which is something we should remember.

Recent history has shown supposedly powerless monarchs taking an active part in politics. They do not deny now (though they did then) the interventions of Queen Victoria. Similarly they do not now deny how George V caused a change in the 'cat and mouse' policy against the suffragettes, or how he chaired secret meetings to form the 1931 National Government – which most MP's first heard on the radio. Even since the war monarchs have interfered: George VI directed Clement Attlee to appoint Ernest Bevin instead of Hugh Dalton as Foreign Secretary. Most recently Margaret Thatcher herself has revealed in her memoirs how our present Queen intervened in Commonwealth Affairs and stopped the privatisation of the Post Office. The problem is not in getting people to admit it has happened, but that it does or could happen.

It is irrelevant whether you consider the interventions to be beneficial. At best this has been coincidentally fortuitous. At other times it has been very much against the public interest. When Lloyd George tried to sack General Douglas Haig after the battle in Flanders, Haig appealed directly to his friend the King. As the

General noted in his private journal,

"The King...stated he would support me through thick and thin, but I must be careful not to resign, because Lloyd George would then appeal to the country for support and would probably come back with a great majority...the King's position would then be very difficult" ²

Many others have testified to this fantastic alliance of a king and a soldier against the elected government. Surely the Windsors must wince when they see 'For King and Country' so accusingly, and so accurately, inscribed on the tombstones of the many fallen.

It was only the accident of Wallis Simpson that prevented the coronation of a Nazi sympathiser in 1936 (but then again all things based on the heredity principle are by accident). He repeatedly refused Churchill's demands to leave Spain during the war – at a time when the Spanish Blue division was fighting under Hitler's command on the eastern Front. And he never seems to have abandoned his conviction that Hitler had a point. While I do not doubt his patriotism, I have no doubt that his social conscience, which led him to admire the low unemployment and the aura of social cohesion in Nazi Germany, also had a powerful effect. He was as fallible as any other man, and like any other man he could have been manipulated. Had things gone the other way, he could have provided the 'force' for stability of a quite different sort.

In 1911 the then Prince of Wales, later Edward VIII and potential Nazi collaborator, as he recalled in his memoirs, was compelled to

attend his 'investiture'. Nobody knew what an investiture was to look like. But Lloyd George, faced with the threats of insurrection in Ireland, the rise of Labour and the women's suffrage movement decided on a 'carnival of national unity, decked out in the finery of glamour and pageantry'. Let us hope the present administration desists from a cynical celebration of history for ulterior political motives.

And so it was this recent theatre which set a precedent for the investiture of the present Prince of Wales at Carnarvon in 1969. The similarities are uncanny. Both have endured long periods of waiting for a job they have spent their lives preparing for. Both are seen as liberal men with a genuine social conscience. Both have sought actively to be a 'prince of the people' and have taken up causes on the margins of their accepted role (for example Charles' views on Electoral Reform). Both have had problems with 'public morality'. At the moment there exists no other challenging extremist ideology, but let us hope the analogy ends there. For if nothing else it is a well understood and common psychological phenomenon that thinking men in such positions of vacuum have a predisposition to ideological capture.

There is certainly no law saying that the monarch has powers to do any of these things. But he or she does have prestige, and rights of audience. That is to say they have more influence than you or I **because** they are the King or Queen. We may prefer the word 'influence' but it is still a form of power. Walter Bagehot put it quite nicely:

"As long as the human heart is strong

and the human reason weak, royalty will be strong because it appeals to diffuse feeling, and Republics weak because they appeal to understanding"

Indeed these feelings are powerful. Why else would we fight and die for 'King and Country'? The truth is that short of summary execution or detention in solitary confinement of the entire succession to the throne which might be, to say the least, somewhat controversial, you cannot abolish monarchy by decree. This is because the powers I have described do not exist by decree.

Hence calls for the abolition of the monarchy in fact are not calls for its abolition at all. It is a call for a different type of monarchy. It would be like Bulgaria's exiled monarch in Greece, or that of Greece, exiled in Britain – for whom the whole Greek navy is readied everytime he goes on a yachting holiday in the Mediterranean. A better analogy would be our own Edward VIII, who when relieved of the rights of kingship by democracy was also relieved of the responsibilities of kingship. Instead I would like to see a monarchy under the thumb of the will of the people. I would like to see it at the behest and service of the people. And if keeping the monarchy on side is the price that has to be paid for it, then so be it.

I have put the case for maintaining the monarchy, but in no way do I want to denigrate its defects. In fact the obsession of the Republican debate tends to polarise views exclusively on this issue, and as the monarchists win, nothing is changed. Why should keeping a monarchy mean keeping all the warts? Things are not black and white. What I advocate, in the best

liberal tradition, is a bit of tinkering. Some may say that this is simply the easy option, but reform has always been a realistic, reasoned and principled position.

As Her Majesty herself said, "No institution – city, monarch, whatever – should expect to be free from the scrutiny of those who offer it their loyal support, not to mention those who don't". Why not create a Select Committee on the Queen? I fear it may be the only way we can gain a reasoned debate on reforms which the dead-end approach of insisting on a republic misses.

Today, MP's taking the parliamentary oath, and Ministers the oath of the Privy Council understand that they are not swearing their loyalty to the monarch as a person. Still, well into the 1960's the Palace of Westminster was a royal palace and MP's were stopped outside 'working hours'. And the principle that 'the king can do no wrong' has been extended to give Crown immunity to the whole public service – to the point where pest-infested NHS kitchens could not be prosecuted. Those who say that without monarchy, Britain would be a banana republic are closing their eyes to those very features which we exhibit here.

Similarly it is Her Majesty's ministers who invoke the Royal Prerogative. This includes powers to make Orders in Council, declare war and peace, recognise governments and ratify treaties, grant pardons, honours and patronage appointments to keep the civil service, armed forces, and senior politicians and businessmen reasonably sweet. This would look corrupt if it were not sanctioned by the Crown. Trevelyan

commented on the potency of these powers in that:

*"George the Third had no occasion to march his guards to Westminster, or commit leaders of the Opposition to the Tower of London, as long as he could make sure of a parliamentary majority by an unscrupulous abuse of government patronage"*³

That these powers unchanged are now the Prime Minister's mean that far from being a check or balance in the constitution, the monarchy is a guarantor of unchecked executive power.

Crown immunity and the Royal Prerogative should be replaced by a defined set of executive powers. But surely the Queen's own interference in politics must be stamped out. This could start with the cosmetic, such as rewording MP's and Privy Councillors' oaths to avoid swearing supreme allegiance to the Queen. The politicised 'Queen's Speech' should be replaced by a Prime Ministerial state of the nation address. We could go on to more substantive issues by giving the Speaker the role of appointing the Prime Minister, as in Sweden, and ending audiences with the Queen, which is surely an unnecessary occupier of precious time of the Head of Government. None of these things are particularly significant, but cumulatively they could lead to a most desirable understanding that monarchs **do not** interfere in politics.

The estimated private wealth of the Queen runs into billions, and she has personal use of public assets such as the royal yacht Britannia and the Royal Flight funded by the MoD, and a healthy selection of castles. Jimmy Carter sold

off the United States' yacht years ago and it is usual for members of government to be sectioned off on normal or specially commissioned flights. Is it not obscene that air passengers' safety is endangered as aircraft crowd into less space while royalty travel in huge 'purple airways'? Whatever is the tolerable safety margin should apply to all; either most people's safety is impaired or royalty is hogging too much airspace. Our royal family is one of the wealthiest in the world, and they would live very comfortably without a civil list, as do most monarchies, deposed or not. Of course they could be paid for special ambassadorial or trade missions and tourism promotion, payment for which would not be likely to be substantial, but they would be employed on a contractual basis which is performance and activity based. Meanwhile, the legal distinction between private and state wealth, at the moment a grey area, should be clarified, and the royal households made subject to domestic and employment laws (such as those against discrimination) like the rest of us.

At the coronation of the present Queen, the Times carried an editorial which did actually say,

"Today's sublime ceremonial is in form, and in common view a dedication of the State to God's service through the prayers and benedictions of the church. That is a noble conception, and of itself makes every man and woman in the land a partaker in the mystery of the Queen's anointing. But the Queen also stands for the soul as well as the body of the Commonwealth. In her is incarnate on her Coronation the whole of Society, of which the State is no more than a political manifestation"

It would not be overstatement to say that the divine right principle is far from dead. That doctrine makes impossible the separation of church and state – and the notion that a private matter between God and man should have a place in formal politics. It is insulting to the large Roman Catholic, Jewish and Muslim communities, not to mention the secular majority, members of whom have fallen in battle for this country, that the monarch must swear to be of 'body protestant' and to 'uphold the faith'. This should be abolished as insulting, and religious oaths separated from the coronation. Instead the monarch should swear that personal convictions will not impinge on public duties.

The tenure of the office could be further reformed. There was a time when we could get rid of monarchs we didn't like. Sadly a more civilised society has meant that regicide is no longer an option, but it might be well that a formalised procedure by which we could impeach a monarch were established. Monarchy is the epitome of social distinction, hierarchy and the feudal heredity principle. It is an unfortunate part of the 'magic' of monarchy in people's minds. But perhaps we could get rid of the primogeniture principle and the let the eldest child, regardless of sex, be the monarch, as in Sweden. No greater symbolic gesture could be made that we are no longer a sexist society.

A more realistic debate than we have now must follow. These issues are simply not addressd. In short what I am calling for is a Scandinavian-style monarchy. On with all the colour, glamour and pageantry, but without the insidious substance. (cont p 24) →

The Oxford Reform Club

The non-partisan Oxford Reform Club was founded in 1992 to support:

¶ Europe

¶ Social Justice

¶ Internationalism

¶ A Progressive attitude
towards politics

...and to provide the only forum for
informed and reasoned debate on
political issues in Oxford

Since its founding in 1992 The Oxford Reform Club has grown to become the second largest political society in the University. It is the only club which can have non-partisan discussion of political issues, drawing on activists from all three parties, and which does so in an informed and reasoned way, free from the distortions of rhetoric. Papers and other material are made available to participants before discussions are held, allowing informed debate.

We believe firmly that Britain's future lies in Europe, and that we must be at the centre of the European Union's development. Action by the international community is vital and must be channelled through the United Nations. British political issues must, we believe, be considered in a forward-looking way, with social justice an aim rather than a fortunate by-product of national policy. All these issues, we believe, deserve to be looked at in a fresh way, and discussion **must** be free from the constraints of traditional party policy.

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Russia – Revolving Again?

Olly Robbins takes a look at Russia's current problems in their historical context

What does everyone know about Russia? It is either "undergoing a democratic revolution" or "getting more like us" or simply "changing". What are the most oft-used adjectives at dinner parties? "Fascinating" or "interesting", "I'd love to go there". Yet fewer and fewer people do, even though it becomes a more accessible, safer and more Western place by the day.

It is time to think again. Russia is indeed revolving again – but revolutions are by their nature circular. One of the commonest criticisms of the period of Bolshevik rule from 1918–1991 was that one repressive, autocratic regime had merely replaced another. There are two theses I wish to attack in this article. The first is that which sees communism in Russia as "the experiment which failed". The second is that which assumes everything now to be, if not changed, at least in a state of flux, with competitive markets and elections building the Russia which Peter the Great envisaged – essentially Western Europe and "civilised".

"The Experiment which failed" is what liberal Russians call the Soviet era,

and yet no-one seems to have noted that the experiment was hardly conducted in fair conditions. The Russian state has endured more than any other major nation in the twentieth century, and has achieved more too.

"The Russian state has endured more than any other major nation in the twentieth century, and has achieved more too"

As Mikhail Shalyukin has recently pointed out, in contrast with the wishful thinking of recent Russian reformers and historical revisionists, 1917 Tsarist Russia was not even distantly likely to evolve into a capitalist democracy with the civil society now being striven for. The vast majority of Russians had been the property of a tiny aristocracy until half a century previously. Rather than a competitive market economy developing, any elements of entrepreneurship were squashed by the Imperial bureaucracy, which took over profitable ventures and monopolised them, and let the initially unprofitable founder. There was no middle class worthy of the

name, and as the rich held their capital as vast, inefficiently farmed estates, little investment. In fact in 1910 over 40% of shares on joint-stock companies in Russia were held by foreign concerns or individuals.

As for democracy and civil society, protests were put down more clumsily and violently before the Bolshevik takeover of power than after it. Newspapers were printed by the Imperial permission, and the Duma, elected by the literate and propertied, (3% of males), met only to rubber stamp the Tsar's decrees if he felt the need for support.

"More Russians can read than Britons, there are almost no homeless people in Moscow"

As often, it is valuable to distinguish between a nation and a state. The Tsarist state was centralized, authoritarian but mismanaged and uninfluential. Outside the major cities, local lords, clergy and the occasional professional (simply anyone literate) were just as important to the peasants as decrees from St Petersburg.

The state, however, ignored largely the fundamental issue of nationhood. The men and women peopling the Tsar's empire had no national identity. Frequently, they adhered more to the state-promoted Orthodox Church than to a conception of

Russian-ness. 90% of Russians asked in 1900 declared their nationality to be "Orthodox".

The October Revolution and the following Bolshevik government therefore took over a nation recovering from over three years of foreign warfare which the Russian aristocratic army was losing, and over three years of bloody and vicious civil war. In 1921, the Communist experiment began inauspiciously, in a devastated nation, stifled by bureaucracy and repression, stagnated by feudalism and riven by poverty, ill health and illiteracy.

This year, standing before a magnificent, or monstrous, Stalinist gothic building in Moscow, a fellow English tourist described the Soviet government as an "Evil Regime". I would never disagree that some of the deeds done in the name of communism were evil, but it is as well to look at the era's aims and achievements.

First among these were the aims of free and fair education, housing and healthcare. These were also the main planks of the post-war consensus here in Britain, and could hardly be described as evil. What is more, they were achieved. More Russians can read than Britons, there are almost no homeless people in Moscow, unlike London, and Russian medicinal science is an acknowledged world leader in many fields. This is rendered all the more impressive since Russia endured such destruction in the Second World War, Fifteen million Russians were killed in the

"Great Patriotic War", more than any other nation, and this goes a long way towards explaining the Eastern Europe buffer zone, paranoid security and the brutal repressions and purges of Stalin.

Another achievement was the making of a state, a world power indeed, and one that its people could be proud of. The Soviet leaders changed Russia from a backward peasant autocracy, despised by the West, into a technological giant at whom the world cowered in fear for half a century.

Lastly, the demise of the Soviet experiment means that for those growing up in the world today, especially western Europe, there appears to be no alternative to the mad excesses of modern capitalism. To the thinking man and woman, Soviet Russia may not have been ideal, but it was food for thought in the "greed is good" climate of the 1980's.

"Yeltsin...is a bully by profession"

Secondly, therefore, what has changed? Beneath the veneer accorded to it by the western media, the Russian Federation is a disintegrating, unstable mess. As the leader of Russia we have exchanged Gorbachev, a committed man who envisaged diligent and thoughtful transformation to allow a civil society to develop after the one party state, and a highly intelligent, kind and educated man,

for Yeltsin. Yeltsin, who is a party boss by training, a bully by profession, who shoots down a parliament more recently and legitimately mandated than himself, and stubbornly tries to transform the economy in one move.

He is not concerned about free speech or democracy, shutting down hostile newspapers and using his army support to override opposition. He rules effectively by decree. Russia is now dirty, criminalised, greedy and self-interested. Its foreign policy, under Red Army influence (why call it by any other name when the staff are identical?), becomes more belligerent and Slavophile by the day. Two Guards regiments are on "goodwill" exercises in Serbia, and 11 000 troops are on standby in the Mediterranean fleet

Have we thrown the baby out with the bath water by supporting Yeltsin? Maybe the bath water was not so dirty anyway...

Olly Robbins is Treasurer of the Oxford Reform Club, and is in his first year reading PPE at Hertford College.

Ooooh, Yes Minister...

Jeremy Hargreaves asks whether politics and sex are natural bedfellows

The trouble which the Conservative party ran into over the "Back to Basics" "policy" at the beginning of the year raised some important questions. None of these was more fundamental than the issue of morality among our elected public representatives. Back to Basics never was more than a slogan; a government "policy" which even the Prime Minister can't define is sadly indicative of the wider lack of direction of the Major administration, and even if it did represent something coherent, merely to say that you are going to go back to some of the policies that we used to have is clear enough evidence of desperation. But then no-one ever pretended that the current cabinet is the world's greatest centre of originality.

But the most important point was undoubtedly the issue of public morality. This is an ongoing theme, and is set to become increasingly important as the gap between society's morality in general and the "Victorian values" that we would half-like everyone to have continues to grow.

Why do we feel that public figures should have high standards of personal morality at all? Firstly, we all like to

think of some fictitious romantic halcyon past when Morality ruled OK, and national leaders, instead of wandering the streets of King's Cross in search of prostitutes for immoral purposes, rather, like Gladstone, walked down the street attempting to persuade them to turn away from their wicked ways. They should, we vaguely feel, be examples to us. Well, if this was ever an appropriate role for politicians, it no longer is. There is no reason why public administrators, (even now that they are public figures too), should be our moral exemplars, especially since we are imposing such a code on them, and the nation quite clearly is not following their lead.

A more important reason is that we entrust the control of our public affairs to politicians to act on our behalf. We have a right to expect that they do so honestly, and observing standards of ethics in certain fields. Any politician who, for example, accepts a bribe with the aim of distorting the use of public money should be out of politics. But there is a very great difference between this and **private and sexual** morality. It is indeed the same man or woman who leads a private life and may be unfaithful to their spouse who conducts business in our name, but it is time that we

actually faced directly the question of whether such **private** behaviour will affect **public** action. There is a difference between sexual and business ethics, and simply because a person does not conform to one set of sexual ethics does not mean that they will not reach acceptable standards of honesty in their business dealings. And in fact, although we may not like to reflect on it, in our own personal lives we accept this; one of the most curious things about the recent "scandals" of sexual morality is that actually to a great extent they reflect the behaviour of the nation as a whole. This does seem unreasonable: certainly we shouldn't expect higher standards of sexual morality from politicians, when we believe ourselves capable high standards of honesty alongside "lax" sexual morals.

But perhaps the most accurate response to the question of why we demand high standards of sexual behaviour from our politicians is that we don't. The scandal which probably ran for the longest and most prominently around the turn of the year was that involving Tim Yeo, and during that period almost all those who discussed the matter in public actually supported him. His friends on the Conservative benches naturally backed up their friend, but his political opponents did not, by and large, use the opportunity to try and dislodge him from office. And this was not simply fear that their party might be next: even political commentators found it difficult to produce a reason why he had to go. The entire head of steam which built

up the pressure against him came from the press. They had their own reasons for doing this, of course; the parliamentary Christmas break is traditionally something of a "silly season", and like anybody else they have to fill their paper and sell their product. The reasons why they behave like this are understandable, if not commendable, but we do not have to be fooled into thinking that we believe in something simply because the tabloid newspapers talk of nothing else for a week.

Perhaps the greatest reason why we should not apply too high standards of personal sexual morality to politicians, is that if we eliminate the sexually over-active politicians, with whom are we left? Because of the gap between the sexually irreproachable ideal and our own personal morality we are left with unrepresentative representatives, but most importantly we eliminate a large number of those who may be our best politicians and statesmen. At its most basic level, the best statesman, the man who can understand and solve a major problem of public administration quickest, and the man who will fight hardest and most effectively for Britain at the Council of Ministers or the G7 Summit is not necessarily the man who is in greatest control of his libido. Until we accept that in selecting our national leaders there are more important factors than a man's relationship with his wife, we will continue to exclude some of the most able politicians from administering our affairs to our own best advantage.

The Future is Bright. The Future is Orange.

Archibald Schwarz considers where the Left should go from here

Any self-respecting psephologist seeking to explain the hegemony of the British Conservative Party in the UK of the twentieth century is acutely aware of two golden rules: one must never underestimate the Labour Party's stupidity nor ever overestimate its imagination. The thoroughgoing impotence of the progressive left is all too apparent to any rational person seeking to replace Tory domination with a feasible social democratic alternative. The problem is that a vast majority of British social democrats have their heads firmly in the sand. Thus, at the risk of boring the enlightened few, I feel obliged to restate the facts.

In the history of the Labour Party, only two men have ever led the party to a majority victory – Clement Attlee and Harold Wilson¹. In contrast, every Conservative leader this century, bar one, has gone on to become Prime Minister². Within this historical context, things have been getting worse and not better for the 'people's party'. It has not come remotely close to winning any of the last four elections and, in real terms, April 9th 1992 was Labour's bleakest hour. In an election held in the middle of an economic recession, with a diabolical Tory

campaign and a centre party that had just spent four years contriving to commit political suicide, Labour secured a derisory 35% of the vote. Circumstances could not have been better for them. And they lost. Badly.

Not only is the modern Labour Party completely incapable of winning a General Election, it does not even have the consolation of having been right about any significant matter of policy at any time in the last two decades. Its prevarications over European union, its timidity over constitutional reform and its vapid economic conservatism are testament to Labour's inherent anti-intellectualism. E P Thompson's observation that the Labour Party is "an organization designed to defeat thought of any kind" is as apt as ever.

Worse even than Labour's electoral ineffectiveness and its intellectual frigidity, is its ongoing and seemingly unchallengeable commitment to the infamous, nay notorious, Clause IV. This is perhaps the most obvious and conclusive victory of Neanderthal traditionalism over common sense ever witnessed in post-war British politics. Not only does this

horrific and repressive statement remain in the constitution of the Labour Party, but it also 'graces' the membership card of every Labour activist. Little wonder that the British public are unwilling to entrust the responsibilities of office to an institution unprepared to renounce this nominal and puerile endorsement of Leninism.

To put it simply and concisely, the Labour Party of the 1990's is dead from the neck up and the waist down and doesn't even have the stomach for a hard fight.

The man who deserts the Labour Party for the Liberal Democrats in search of electoral success is rather like the man who forsakes New York for Las Vegas in search of culture. If Labour's inability to win British General Elections has been remarkable then the complete incapacity of the Liberal Democrats³ to achieve any form of substantial political breakthrough has been truly stunning.

At least the Labour Party can claim to, have survived against the tide of history, whereas the Liberal Democrats have had everything running in their favour but have somehow managed to take half a century to increase their parliamentary representation from six MP's to twenty two⁴. If this weren't so tragically sad, it would be laughable.

The reaction of the Labour Party to the collapse of the Keynesian consensus was to reaffirm basic – but fundamentally flawed – radical socialism. The response of the SDP and the Liberals was to attempt to recreate the consensus itself. Whilst this was principally due to the influence of one man, Roy Jenkins, it was

symbolic of an ongoing dilemma in the centre of British politics. Namely, that radical centrists aren't electable, and electable centrists aren't radical. This most basic of political realities effectively ensured that an alliance between the Social Democrats and the Liberals was always bound to be a non-starter. The former – while committed to widespread constitutional reform – were essentially pragmatists with regard to economic and social policy. The latter, despite being led by a social democrat⁵, were continually more interested in street lighting and pavement cracks than in any significant 'bread and butter' issue.

Given the incongruous nature of the alliance⁶, it is quite bizarre that anyone ever considered the notion of merging the two parties, even more ludicrous that a majority of SDP and Liberal Party members supported the idea, and utterly dumbfounding that when effected, the merged party managed to combine the worst elements of both its predecessors. The mixture of dull SDP policies and the monomaniacal Liberal commitment to local government succeeded in producing a formula that was neither inspirational nor credible.

Only since the 1992 election have the Liberal Democrats emerged as something approaching a serious political party. However, they still do not present a significant Parliamentary threat to the Tories outside the confines of the South Western peninsula. Furthermore, any lingering Grimondite hope of replacing Labour as the party of opposition now lies in ruins. The number of Westminster constituencies in which the Lib Dems present a serious threat to Labour can now be counted on

the fingers of one thumb⁷.

The current Conservative administration is enduring one of its sporadic bouts of mid-term unpopularity. But in their more reflective moments, backbench Tory MP's know that they have very little to fear – with enemies like the Liberal Democrats and Labour, who needs friends?

Even the political factors moving in favour of the centre-left are likely to raise as many difficulties as they solve. For example, there is some evidence that the anti-Conservative vote is becoming ever more effectively concentrated. Thus in the Newbury and Christchurch byelections, where the Lib Dems were the clear challengers to the Tories, the Labour vote was squeezed to a humiliating 2%. Similarly, in many urban areas, many SDP voters have reverted to Labour as it has become clear that the latter represent the best chance of unseating the Tory incumbent⁸. On the surface, this increase in tactical voting provides both parties with the opportunity to increase their Parliamentary representation. However, it is also likely to ensure that the issue of Lib-Lib co-operation remains on the agenda. And that is an issue with which neither the Lib Dems nor Labour can cope, the former because they are terrified of alienating soft Tory voters in the South and the latter because they are psychologically incapable of relinquishing the dream of outright victory.

The position of the British centre-left has rightly been described as 'The Progressive Dilemma'⁹. In terms of policy, there is very little to choose between the two opposition

parties. Their electoral prospects are mutually dependent – the Lib Dems requiring Labour to make gains in order to ensure that the Tories are turfed out of office. Despite this, "formal Lib-Labbery is not on today's menu"¹⁰, due to the nature of each party's support and workings of each party's internal machinery.

If neither Labour nor the Lib Dems can look with any confidence to a bright independent future and if meaningful co-operation between the two parties is an impracticality, then British progressives are forced to an unavoidable, yet unpalatable, conclusion. Namely that the creation of a new, cohesive and unity progressive party is a precondition to winning and retaining political power. Many may claim that the disastrous failure of the SDP experiment disproves this theory, but the distinction is the the SDP always was (indeed always intended to be) a divisive rather than a unifying force on the progressive left. Some political commentators have begun to consider this possibility – "it is worth examining the possibility of a new social democratic alternative to Tory rule, perhaps even an eventual merger of the civilised, free-market part of the Labour Party with the Lib Dems...the feeling is growing acute that it is ludicrous for the modern end of the Labour Party not, in the longer term, to blend with the Lib Dems"¹¹.

It is now a moral duty for all those on the progressive, forward-thinking wing of politics to put this tactical concept, currently the preserve of the chattering classes, into effect. The meshing of communitarian Liberalism and democratic socialism into a single political unit would have the double benefit of granting

← (continued from p 14)

Of course, the Royal Family has not always been held in such reverence. Upon Queen Victoria's Jubilee in 1877, the Prime Minister, the Marquis of Salisbury, presented a portrait of himself to the Queen. When Queen Elizabeth's Jubilee arrived in 1977 a cabinet discussion was held about what to present to the Queen. Tony Benn suggested a leather bound copy of the Labour Party constitution, but the rest agreed on a reverent presentation of a coffee set. Maybe the reforms I propose may help the monarchy to survive, but perhaps it will be like Lady Bracknell's comment on ignorance, that 'Like a delicate fruit, touch it and the bloom is gone'. The crucial thing is that this is because of the transformation from unthinking subjects to critical citizens, not in spite of it. Only then will we be rid of our most un-English of English traditions, the cult of Windsor.

Notes:

- ¹ Christopher Hitchens: *The Monarchy*
- ² *ibid.*
- ³ George Otto Trevelyan: *The American Revolution*

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← (cont from p 23)

credibility to the British centre whilst going a considerable way towards removing the fear of the British left (so much of which is associated with the mere word 'Labour'). An electoral alliance would do neither of these and, furthermore, would be correctly viewed as cynical, tenuous and highly fragile.

The current political divisions on the progressive left are inconvenient, unhelpful and anachronistic. Progressives must reorganise if they are to succeed. The future cannot be red. The future cannot be yellow. The future can be bright, but it has to be orange.

Notes:

- ¹ The victory of the former, Clement Attlee, was almost entirely attributable to Adolf Hitler.
- ² Austen Chamberlain
- ³ Or Liberal Party or SDP or Alliance.
- ⁴ Presumably increasing to a fleeting 23 after the Eastleigh byelection on 9th June.
- ⁵ Loony Liberal activists were despised even more by David Steel, the then Liberal Party leader, than they were by Dr Owen.
- ⁶ The Conservatives, Labour and the SDP had far more in common with each other than any of them had in common with the Liberal Party.
- ⁷ Birmingham Yardley.
- ⁸ The results in Exeter, Plymouth and Stockton South at the last election provided the clearest evidence of this.
- ⁹ In Professor David Marquand's excellent book of that title.
- ¹⁰ *The Economist* ; July 17th 1993
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*

Social Justice: Progressive platitude or practical policy?

Tim Brown asks what this apparently uncontroversial idea means in practice

The concept is probably one from which few, right across the political spectrum, would dissent. What it actually means is of course a question of more considerable dispute, though the general thrust of the idea would seem to be economic security and civil rights in various forms. If we can ground social justice in something a bit more fundamental and solid it may become a more useful concept and one that involves certain clear policy implications.

It would seem to me that social justice springs from a recognition of the fundamental equality of human beings; that I do not deserve more than anyone else simply by virtue of being me. This need make no claims to material equality but does entail some sort of political equality, universally accepted in the democratic policy of one person one vote

This very basic and fundamental equality can be seen as a simple statement of morality. It is an opening up of the mind to see other people's views, conditions and desires and allows them to impact to some extent on our own mind-set. This statement of moral universalism entails the necessity of political inclusivism: the political system should not discriminate on grounds of race, gender, sexuality etcetera. Moreover, it

should actively seek to remove the obstacles that exist as a result of these arbitrary discriminations. The fundamental power equality espoused by democracy requires an attack on power imbalances, whether in relation to the woman sexually harassed at the workplace or the black beaten up in the streets.

"Whatever rights you might renounce by breaking the law, that act does not constitute a renunciation of humanity"

The question arises of what constitutes an arbitrary discrimination and what a legitimate one. To take the example of a criminal, it is fair and just that one treats him differently by reason of their chosen actions, but breaking the law, whatever rights you may renounce through that act, does not constitute a renunciation of humanity, nor does it remove the obligation of others to consider you and your welfare in their political choices. This is not just sad liberal pandering to criminals but a pragmatic realisation that to treat a section of society as sub-human or politically irrelevant is morally repugnant and, if that were not enough, also imprudent.

The prudential basis of social justice is clear. It is not simply an insurance scheme for the possibility that we might break the law, or lose our jobs. It is prudential in a far more fundamental way. It is a social system for regulating the human condition and insuring that we get through life in the most pleasant way. For this we need an open-minded humanitarian political view which will not only help to ease the problems of those against whom we might otherwise be bigoted but will also, when reciprocated, ease our own problems since all of us have some quirk, some strange desire or 'abnormality' which could mark us out as the victim for some brutal discrimination.

"We must seek to empower all individuals while fostering a sense of responsibility and care for others' interests"

The policy implications of social justice should be clear. This does not mean simply active support for the discriminated against, but actively breaking down economic barriers to personal and collective advancement. We must seek to empower all individuals while fostering a sense of responsibility and care for others' interests. It means a radical mixture of policies from both right and left, which are antiquated terms no longer useful in defining an exclusive policy agenda. Vested interests, be they unions, employers, the media, the establishment or whatever, should be attacked in favour of a universal, inclusive political view that puts overall social welfare and community and well-being at the front of policy-making.

An inescapable implication of this would seem to be an assault on unemployment with at least equal tenacity to that against inflation in the last 15 years.

"Most importantly, a serious and extensive training programme must be undertaken to make the vast number of long term unemployed able to seek work"

On this issue the present parties find it very hard to break out of ideological dogma; many Conservatives are hooked on the monetarist view that you control inflation and unemployment will sort itself out - any intervention is simply inflationary or inhibits the free markets. Many on the left are still sold on so-called Keynesian demand stimuli, without a way of keeping the lid on inflation.

The economy's low output and absurd under-use of human resources suggests a demand stimulus, spending money to increase demand and hence output, would be appropriate either at a national or a supranational (European) level. However, a pay policy would have to be considered if inflation were to be restrained during the transition phase to lower unemployment.

Many other policies are available for reducing unemployment. Better discussion of what the economy can afford in wages should be undertaken, as in Germany.

Most importantly, a serious and extensive training programme must be undertaken to make the vast number of long term unemployed able to seek work. Over half the unemployed have been out of work for over a year – that is simply a total waste of resources as it exerts no downward pressure on wages since they are not effective competitors in the Labour market: they are viewed as unemployable. In Sweden you are guaranteed a job after 14 months or are put on a training programme; either way your benefit entitlement stops.

Open-ended benefits must have some incentive effect to finding work. We must be clear that people have an obligation to society as well as society having an obligation to people. If you choose to opt out of society there is no reason why society should fund you or tolerate any anti-social behaviour. Equally, if you want to participate in society you must be enabled and encouraged so to do.

A fundamental re-assessment of the taxation and benefit system is long overdue. The absurdly high marginal rates of tax that exist at the bottom of the income scale are even more absurd than the high rates at the top of the scale which the Conservatives removed so swiftly. Benefits must be a safety net, not an alternative life-style: if people are penalised for working by having benefits removed to the extent that they are no better off, then something has clearly gone badly wrong. The priority for the tax benefit system should therefore be that it protects the needy but also allows and encourages people to improve their situation by working and earning money.

Such economic reforms have their problems, but are fundamental and inescapable if society is to bind together again and re-establish some sort of communal value system that allows us all to live in better harmony. This is not just wishful thinking: it is the very purpose of society. Social justice is necessary for an ordered and useful society. It demands an inclusive economic and political system that actively helps the disadvantaged and draws everyone in. It requires a defence of blacks, women, gays, the unemployed, the homeless etc. not as groups separate or different from everyone else but as human beings essentially a part of humanity and society, and fundamentally equal to one another.

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